Pathogenic agents - that are important to life sciences - can also be used to develope biological weapons. This project developed recommendations on how to deal with this potential threat.

Discussions in scientific and governmental circles show that the concept of ‘dual use research’, and the best way to deal with it, can be ambiguous and is sometimes disputed. One result of the project is an acceptable, adequate definition of ‘dual use’ that researchers, universities, companies and policy makers can work from. Another result are recommendations for a regulatory framework that is ethically acceptable, but also politically and scientifically feasible. Amongst others, the project clarified the responsibilities of different actors. 

The researchers propose that a dual use problem in biological sciences arises when:

• research, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be misapplied and;
• there is a recognisable threat and a not negligible chance of such misuse and;
• there are serious consequences for society and science (public health and safety, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or material).

The project resulted in the following list of recommendations for a regulatory framework addressing dual use concerns:

1. Extend the remit of existing biosafety committees in universities to include biosecurity issues;
2. Require commercial firms to establish biosafety / biosecurity committees;
3. Develop enforceable professional codes of conduct for relevant personnel (e.g. scientists);
4. Establish an independent authority at the national level to deal with safety and security issues in biological/converging sciences including, but not restricted to, dual use issues;
5. Agent rules should be revised on functionality rather than just listing the agents;
6. Make/implement an international/multilateral agreement regarding safety and security issues in the biological sciences - including but not restricted - to dual use issues;
7. Create national legislation and protocols for safety and security issues in the biological sciences, including but not restricted to dual use issues, which are standardized and harmonised (e.g., export controls should apply worldwide);
8. Create an international clearinghouse under a multilateral agreement to oversee control over buying and selling of DNA sequences and/or other dual use materials (i.e., all orders would need to be reported to, and approved by, the clearinghouse);
9. Add verification procedures to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention;
10. Periodically review / revise dual use measures at the institutional, national, and international level.
11. Make awareness raising, training, and education mandatory for relevant personnel (see table)

 

		Personnel engaged in dual use activities
		Scientists	Students	Laboratory assistants	Managers (firms)	Employees (firms)	Academic editors	Mass media editors, journalists
Mode of intervention	Subject to screening / background checks	X	X	X	X	X
	Registration	X					X
	Awareness Raising					X		X
	Training			X	X
	Education	X	X				X
	Codes of conduct	X					X
	Subject to accountability / oversight (e.g. audits, monitoring)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Recommended awareness / training / education interventions per personnel type (table 4 in report)

 

In their Report on Biosecurity and Dual Use Research the researchers include a number of additional tables, which summarise various insights gained in the project on different regulation types and responsibilities and the range of their applicability. For example, at universities an internal biosatefy and biosecurity committee and an independent authority should share responsibility for the compliance with regulations regarding physical safety and security. And multinational corporations have various responsibilities (although shared with other actors), namely for

• Criminal investigation
• Countermeasures
• Rules for research (screening, behavior, funding, publishing)
• Physical safety and security
• Trade and transport rules
• Awareness raising, education and training
• Accountability systems (e.g. complaints/discipline system, code of conduct, audit system, monitoring system)

 

The following reports can be looked up in the policy report:

 

	Horizontal table axis	Vertical table axis
Table 1: Regulations / item	Items with a dual use character (e.g. equipment, laboratories, universities)	Regulation types (e.g. selecting agents, licensing, prohibition);
Table 2: The university	Academic actors (e.g. individual scientists, professional associations, funding agencies)	Responsibilities (e.g. for physical safety & security, accountability systems, dual use policies);
Table 3:  The private sector	Private actors (.g. lab workers, suppliers, shareholders)	Responsibilities (e.g. training, countermeasure R&D)
Table 5: The policy process	Policy actors (e.g. national governments, multinational corporations)	Responsibilities (e.g. trade and transport rules, criminal investigation)

bioterrorism, pathogenic agents, life sciences, biological weapons, biological weapons, dual use, biosecurity, biosafety, legislation, biomedical research, biological sciences

Official project title: